PORCH BRAWL TRIGGERS COVERAGE DISPUTE

469_C315


PORCH BRAWL TRIGGERS COVERAGE DISPUTE


Homeowners

Duty To Defend

Intentional Act

 

On April 15, 2002, Joseph Walukiewicz and Kevin Brown were involved in a physical altercation while standing on the front porch of a house that belonged to Brown’s estranged wife. Brown had arrived there seeking to speak with his wife, and Walukiewicz, after informing Brown that she was sleeping, encouraged Brown to leave. The two men continued to discuss the matter while standing in close proximity to each other on the front porch. At some point Walukiewicz grabbed Brown, turned to one side and tossed Brown away from him. As a result of these actions, Brown fell down the porch steps and sustained significant injuries to his leg.

Brown filed a negligence action against Walukiewicz seeking compensation for his injuries. Vermont Mutual Insurance Company, Walukiewicz’s homeowners insurer, filed a declaratory judgment action, asking the court to determine that the policy’s intentional acts exclusion applied and that it therefore was not obligated to defend or indemnify Walukiewicz.

Prior to a jury trial to determine whether or not the policy provided coverage for Brown's negligence claim, Vermont Mutual filed two motions. The first motion sought to preclude evidence as to the nature and extent of Brown's injuries. The second motion sought to preclude any evidence that Walukiewicz was acting in self-defense.

The trial court granted both of the motions. As to the first motion, the trial court reasoned that the proper inquiry for determining whether the intentional injury exclusion applied was an objective one, i.e., if one intends to act, it may be inferred that he also intends the natural and probable consequences of that act. Accordingly, evidence that might indicate whether Walukiewicz subjectively had intended to inflict the injuries suffered by Brown was not relevant. As to the second motion, the court reasoned that the policy did not explicitly provide for a self-defense exception to the intentional injury exclusion, that a person acting in self-defense necessarily is acting intentionally, and that self-defense, while it perhaps provides a justification or motive for an act that causes injury, does not render that act unintentional.

After instructing the jury that it should apply an “objective” standard (what a “reasonable person” would have intended) to determine whether or not Walukiewicz intended to injure Brown, as opposed to evaluating Walukiewicz’s actual “subjective intent,” the lower court found in favor of Vermont Mutual. Walukiewicz appealed.

On appeal, the Supreme Court of Connecticut evaluated the lower court’s decision to apply an “objective standard” as opposed to a “subjective standard” to determine Walukiewicz’s intent. The court noted that acts of self-defense fell within the definition of “occurrence” and that they were “by their very nature . . . spontaneous and unplanned [and] because [they were] unplanned and unintentional, it follow[ed] that they [were] accidental within the meaning of the policy.” In finding that acts of self-defense fell within the intentional injury exclusion, the court stressed that application of the exclusion was triggered “when the insured subjectively expect[ed] or intend[ed] that bodily injury [would] occur, and not merely when an ordinary, reasonable person would be able to foresee injury occurring as a result of his acts.” Accordingly, the court found that the lower court erred when it applied the “objective” standard, and that Walukiewicz’s “subjective” intent---whether he was truly acting in self-defense--was the proper standard.

The decision of the lower court was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings to determine Walukiewicz’s subjective intent.

Vermont Mutual Insurance Company vs. Walukiewicz-No. 18061-Supreme Court of Connecticut-March 17, 2009-966 Atlantic Reporter 2d 672